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Abstract
The paper derives an explicit formula for the near-term carbon price in a dynamic
stochastic general equilibrium climate model in which agents employ arbitrary non-
constant time preference rates. The paper uses a simplified version of the model in
Golosov et al. (2011), though we argue that the added assumptions are unlikely to mat-
ter for our conclusions. The formula is derived first under the assumption that the initial
decision-maker has a commitment device, then solving for the unique subgame perfect
equilibrium. Somewhat remarkably, the near-term carbon price is the same in both cases.
We further show that the near-term carbon price remains unchanged for all potential be-
liefs about the time preference structure of future generations. It follows that concerns
about time inconsistency can be safely ignored when applying the derived formula. The
carbon price is the same as the Pigouvian tax in the equilibrium with commitment, and
it is bigger than the Pigouvian tax in the equilibrium without commitment provided
damages are sufficiently persistent. The formula reduces to the carbon price formula in
Golosov et al. (2011) when discounting is constant, and it reduces to the carbon price
formula in Gerlagh and Liski (2012) when discounting is quasi-hyperbolic.
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[Declining discount rates] “solve one problem by creating another. Unless the discount
rate is constant, the policy path is subject to ‘time inconsistency’. Suppose an intelligent
decision-maker plans a strategy for the long future, beginning today. Five years from
now, she reconsiders the strategy, having followed it so far. She will want to change to a
different strategy for no other reason than the passage of time. . . .
This sounds like a poor way to run a railroad.”
Robert Solow in forward to Portney and Weyant (1999)
1 Introduction
The discounted utility model, which assumes a constant discount rate, has strong distribu-
tional consequences when applied to long-term environmental problems in which severe con-
sequences occur with long delay. Provided the discount rate is calibrated to match market
interest rates, the model ensures that large costs will be imposed on future generations that
could have been avoided at relatively little cost today1. This feature of the model is unsettling
in part because the justification for a constant discount rate in social cost benefit analysis
is weak. When introducing the discounted utility model, Samuelson (1937) stated “any con-
nection between utility as discussed here and any welfare concept is disavowed” (Frederick
et al. 2002). Moreover, in axiom systems for the model (Koopmans 1960; Fishburn 1970;
Fishburn and Rubinstein 1982) the primary justification for the stationarity property that
lurks behind the constancy of the discount rate is the assurance of time consistency. But as
discussed below, time consistency is possible under non-constant discounting also. In addi-
tion to normative concerns, a variety of studies from psychology and economics suggest that,
for many individuals, subjective discount rates are better approximated by a hyperbolic dis-
counting function than by a constant exponential function (Thaler 1981; Loewenstein 1987;
Ainslee 1991; Cropper et al. 1994; Kirby and Herrenstein 1995).
A discounting function in which the rate of time preference declines over time is intriguing
in part because it is possible to match market interest rates over the horizon for which such
instruments exist (30 to 40 years at most) then have rates decline in a way that increases
the sensitivity of current actions to distant consequences (Chichilnisky 1996; Heal 2005). A
declining rate of time preference (DRTP) can be justified in three ways. First, by invoking
behavioral evidence, as mentioned above. Second, if there exists a “correct” discount rate, but
it is viewed as an uncertain random variable with a probability distribution that is permanent
over time, the problem solved by an expected utility maximizing decision-maker is formally
equivalent to one with DRTP (Azfar 1999; Weitzman 2001). Finally, if citizens possess
different discount rates and a social planner aggregates preferences by taking a weighted
average of individual utilities, the resulting maximization problem is again equivalent to one
with DRTP (Gollier and Zeckhauser 2005).
Whatever the rationale for non-constant time preference rates2 (NCTP), their use in-
troduces a potential problem that does not arise when the discount rate is constant—time
inconsistency. Under NCTP, the marginal rate of substitution between future periods shifts
as the contemporaneous decision-maker progresses in time. As a result, absent a commitment
device, the long-run policy plan that a decision maker in the initial period would optimally
choose is not a plausible equilibrium since future generations would prefer to deviate. In
1For example, with a discount rate of 5%, a decision maker today would pay at most sixty thousand dollars
to avoid a billion dollars of damages in 200 years.
2In the paper, we allow for the general possibility of non-constant time preference rates, though we are
primarily interested in the case of declining time preference rates.
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principle, time inconsistency can be resolved in a straightforward way by considering a model
that correctly anticipates how future agents are expected to respond; mainly, by requiring
that the equilibrium be subgame perfect (Strotz 1955). But in practice, solving for subgame
perfect equilibria in dynamic economic models can be difficult. To make progress, most
applications of NCTP employ one or more of the following simplifying assumptions.
The first “assumption” has to do with the equilibrium concept. In the original growth
literature that explored time inconsistency issues under NCTP (Strotz 1955, Pollak 1968,
Phelps and Pollak 1968, Goldman 1980) the equilibrium was derived using backward induc-
tion in a finite horizon model3. Peleg and Yaari (1973) call this a Strotz-Pollak equilibrium.
The more recent literature, initiated by Laibson (1997), emphasizes symmetric Markov per-
fect equilibra. A variety of solution strategies have been devised to solve for this type of
equilibrium in stationary, infinite horizon dynamic models (Harris and Laibson 2001; Karp
2007; Fujii and Karp 2008). Nevertheless, the equilibrium concept has two potential flaws.
First, it does not respect the order of decision-makers in the timeline. In long-term environ-
mental applications, it is not clear that policy-makers would accept recommendations that
view the current generation as being artificially constrained by potential strategic threats
from future generations. Second, there are typically a continuum of strategies that satisfy
the conditions for a symmetric Markov perfect equilibrium (Harris and Laibson 2001; Krussel
and Smith 2003; Karp 2005; Karp 2007). A Strotz-Pollak equilibrium has the advantage that
it clearly respects the order of decision-makers in the timeline, and it is more likely to be
unique.
The second assumption that is often employed is to restrict attention to quasi-hyperbolic
discounting functions. Quasi-hyperbolic discounting applies a higher rate of time preference
between the first and second periods, after which the same constant lower rate is applied
across all subsequent periods (Phelps and Pollak 1968, Laibson 1997). Applied to stationary,
infinite-horizon dynamic models, quasi-hyperbolic discounting makes it possible to preserve
a highly-tractable recursive structure (Harris and Laibson 2001). The trouble is inaccu-
racy. Under all three justifications for DRTP, time preference rates decline continuously in
time. Translating these continuous paths into a qualitatively similar quasi-hyperbolic path
introduces approximation error that becomes large in settings like climate policy where the
long-run path of discount rates matters a lot. This point is demonstrated in our quantitative
section.
In this paper, we derive an explicit formula for the near-term carbon price under arbitrary
NCTP, doing so in a setting in which time inconsistency concerns are resolved in a clean and
compelling way. The formula is derived first under the assumption that a commitment device
is available, then using backward induction to solve for the unique Strotz-Pollak equilibrium.
The near-term carbon price is the same in both cases. In particular, while the full trajectory
of optimal policies differ in subsequent periods under the two equilibria, this difference has
no effect on the first-period carbon price. This implies that time inconsistency concerns are
in a significant sense irrelevant in the considered setting4.
Without commitment, it can be argued that the first-period carbon price summarizes
everything decision-makers need to know (on the benefit side) to evaluate current climate
related investment projects. It clearly provides enough information to evaluate projects that
3This was extended to infinite horizon settings by taking the infinite-horizon limit of a sequence of equilibria
to truncated models (as we do in this paper).
4Note that time inconsistency arises when the problem is solved in a way that falsely presumes that a
commitment device is available. Our result shows that whether a commitment device is assumed or not, the
optimal policy today is the same.
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are to be implemented within the period. Meanwhile, plans that require coordination across
multiple periods are arguably infeasible without commitment. In our calibrated model, the
period length is a decade, so our no commitment assumption means that the commitment
length of a given policy regime is at most ten years. Recent experience with global climate
treaties supports the conclusion that climate policy commitment beyond ten years is unlikely.
Indeed, our irrelevance finding is even stronger. In addressing time inconsistency concerns,
the most straightforward solution is to look for a subgame perfect equilibrium in which deci-
sion makers in different periods are identical. But as hard as it is for the current generation
to “know” its own time preference structure, they presumably know significantly less about
the preference structure of subsequent generations (Beltratti, Chichilnisky and Heal 1998).
Accepting this critique, one could be led to entertain a wide range of possible assumptions
about the path of time preference rates likely to be applied by future generations. In section
4.3, we show that, for any path of time preference rates that one might assume for future gen-
erations, the first-period carbon price derived using backward induction remains unchanged.
We refer to this result as “strong irrelevance”5.
Naturally, our strong results are a product of the considered model. We employ a some-
what simplified version of the dynamic, stochastic integrated assessment model developed in
Golosov et al. (2011). The crucial assumptions for our results are (1) logarithmic preferences
and (2) a damage function that multiplies output while taking a “linear-exponential” func-
tional form. As discussed in Golosov et al. (2011), log utility implies that the marginal utility
at which future damages are valued is inversely proportional to output. Because damages are
directly proportional to output, the dependence on future output cancels as these terms are
multiplied when evaluating current policy. Meanwhile, the “linear-exponential” feature of the
damage function, combined with log preferences, gives rise to a value function that is linear
in prior emissions. This feature of the analytical solution is behind a certainty equivalence
result: though the damage elasticity parameter follows a Markov process, the carbon price
formula depends only on the expected value of the parameter in each future period. These
features together explain why the formula depends only on current output, along with the
time preference rates, the carbon cycle parameters, and the expected value of future damage
elasticities. In particular, all dependence on the future paths of consumption, capital, and
emission stocks are notably absent. The same result is found in Golosov et al. (2011), and
indeed our formula reduces to theirs in the case of constant discounting.
A potential criticism is that our strong results depend on the specific functional form
assumptions in Golosov et al. (2011). As emphasized in that paper, these assumptions are
close to those in much of the prior literature on climate policy; nevertheless, the situation
in which income and substitution effects exactly cancel so that current policy is insensitive
to future response behavior is clearly a special case. But there are two considerable advan-
tages of using this setting to consider the implications of DRTP, and we argue that these
advantages more than make up for the potential arbitrariness that accompanies our reliance
on specific functional forms. First, in dynamic analyses of climate policy with NCTP and no
commitment, the optimal choice by the current generation will typically depend on the likely
response behavior (i.e., the state-contingent policy rules) assumed for future generations. But
any attempt to model the preferences and response behavior of future generations is itself
5Golosov et al. (2011) note that their formula for the near-term carbon price would be unaffected if
the model was changed to incorporate endogenous technology choice. The reason is that these alternative
assumptions would affect the future paths of the endogenous variables, but the future paths of those variables
do not affect the near-term carbon price. Our strong irrelevance finding is closely related to this alternative
irrelevance finding in Golosov (2011).
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unavoidably arbitrary. A model in which current policy is insensitive to these assumptions
may therefore be less arbitrary then a criterion for selecting among the myriad of potential
specifications for describing the time preferences and choice procedure of future generations.
Second, the argument for DRTP becomes much cleaner within the Golosov et al. (2011)
framework. In particular, under what are arguably the two most compelling justifications for
DRTP—(1) that the correct rate of time preference is uncertain and (2) that the planner seeks
to aggregate diverse views across society—an important concern in most applications is that
they impose the accompanying assumption that current information is frozen in time. Thus,
there is no room for learning about the correct discount rate (under uncertainty), or for the
distribution of views in society to evolve (under aggregation). Given the long time horizon in
our application, this assumption is implausible. But with strong irrelevance, the concern falls
away. When computing the path of discount rates that is relevant for determining the near
term carbon price, we only need to consider current uncertainty or the current distribution
of views. The expectation that these may change over time would imply that the path of
time preference rates to be used by subsequent decision-makers would change, but this has
no effect on the optimal carbon price today.
The model in the paper simplifies the Golosov et al. (2011) framework in two ways—
though we argue in section 4.4 that these simplifications are unlikely to matter for our results.
The simplifications follow recent work by Gerlagh and Liski (2012). Unlike those authors,
we retain the stochastic portion of the original Golosov et al. (2011) model. In addition, we
allow time preference rates to follow an arbitrary non-constant path, and we emphasize the
Strotz-Pollak equilibrium, which we show to be unique. Gerlagh and Liski (2012) consider
the case of quasi-hyperbolic discounting, and they solve for a particular symmetric Markov
perfect equilibrium6. The first simplification is to assume that production in the energy
extraction sector depends on labor and fossil fuel inputs only. In contrast, energy production
in Golosov et al. (2011) depends also on energy and capital inputs, both of which are assumed
to be mobile across sectors. The second simplification is to assume that fossil fuel reserves
are effectively infinite7.
The paper also solves for the Pigouvian taxes under each equilibrium. Following Gerlagh
and Liski (2012), we take this to be the present value marginal externality cost discounted at
the equilibrium real return. Since the future real return is different under the two equilibria,
the corresponding Pigouvian taxes are also different. We find that the optimal first-period
carbon tax (from our formula) equals the Pigouvian tax under commitment, but it is greater
than the Pigouvian tax without commitment provided the delay between emissions and dam-
ages is sufficiently long. In the latter case, the wedge between the optimal carbon price and
the Pigouvian tax without commitment reflects the “commitment value” of climate policy.
As discussed in Gerlagh and Liski (2012), the idea of commitment value in this setting is
analogous to the value that Laibson (2007) attributes to commitment devices in self-control
problems. In the current setting, climate policy provides a mechanism for transferring wealth
to distant generations that partially bypasses the control of intermediate generations who,
6Our paper builds on the work of Gerlagh and Liski (2012) in multiple ways, including our computation of
the implied equilibrium Pigouvian taxes in section 5. A further important contribution of Gerlagh and Liski
(2012) is to derive an alternative motivation for the linear coefficients in the Golosov et al. (2011) linear-
exponential damage function that is consistent with a carbon cycle in which the delay between emissions and
damages is more consistent with some prior integrated assessment models, including DICE (Nordhaus 2008).
7This assumption is plausible along an optimal policy path since most models would stop extracting fossil
fuels before existing coal deposits are fully exploited. In addition, as we argue later, the assumption of finite
reserves does not affect the near term carbon price in Golosov et al. (2011) and we see no reason to expect
that it would affect the carbon price under non-constant discounting either.
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under hyperbolic discounting, are more impatient.
A further contribution of the paper is to demonstrate a solution strategy for deriving the
Strotz-Pollak equilibrium in a discrete time dynamic model with non-constant discounting.
The solution strategy is conceptually related to the heuristic device in Harris and Laibson
(2001). This is used to solve for symmetric Markov perfect equilibria in infinite horizon
models with quasi-hyperbolic discounting. Fujii and Karp (2008) generalize the approach to
allow time preference rates to be non-constant over a finite period. Our algorithm differs in
that we solve for the backward induction solution in a truncated (finite-horizon) version of
the model, then take the infinite horizon limit. Our approach is therefore more closely related
to finite horizon dynamic programming. The standard finite horizon dynamic programming
algorithm is modified to ensure that the continuation value functions appropriately account
for the distinct time preferences of hyperbolic agents at different dates.
Our irrelevance finding under log utility has precedence in the literature. Phelps and Pol-
lak (1968) consider a finite horizon growth model with linear production and quasi-hyperbolic
time preference. They refer to savings in the full commitment equilibrium as first-best na-
tional savings and to savings in the no commitment (backward induction) equilibrium as
second-best national savings. The effect of commitment on national savings in the initial
period hinges on the elasticity of marginal utility. When the elasticity is one (corresponding
to log utility) first- and second-best savings are the same. Indeed, they show that no matter
what savings rate is adopted by subsequent generations when solving the problem using back-
ward induction, the optimal savings choice for the initial generation remains unchanged. This
is analogous to our strong irrelevance result. Phelps and Pollak (1968) conclude, “This loga-
rithmic case must be added to the curious list of examples in which first-best and second-best
decisions do not differ.”
The results in Phelps and Pollak (1968) do not carry over to the more general Ramsey
model. Barro (1999) solves for the unique Cournot-Nash equilibrium in a version of the
Ramsey model with logarithmic preferences that allows for a continuously declining path
of time preference rates. He also solves the model by assuming a commitment device. In
both cases, the marginal propensity to consume out of wealth is a constant. Moreover, in
the initial period, the marginal propensity to consume out of wealth is the same constant in
both equilibria. Nevertheless, the amount of savings in the initial period differs across the
two equilibria. The reason is that wealth is forward-looking, and it differs under the two
scenarios8.
The paper contributes to the literature in which optimal climate policy is derived in the
presence of declining time preference rates. Nordhaus (1999), Mastrandrea and Schneider
(2001), and Guo et al. (2006) all solve for optimal carbon prices under hyperbolic discount-
ing. All of these authors solve their respective problems numerically, while assuming a com-
mitment device. Karp (2005) solves for the (set of) symmetric Markov perfect equilibria in
a one dimensional stock pollution abatement problem when discounting is quasi-hyperbolic.
Gerlagh and Liski (2011) also solve for a symmetric Markov perfect equilibrium under quasi-
hyperbolic discounting. Karp (2007) develops methods to derive a Markov perfect equilibrium
in a continuous time dynamic setting with arbitrary NCTP, and he applies these methods to
a carbon abatement problem. In addition, Fujii and Karp (2008) develop numerical meth-
ods to solve for the symmetric Markov perfect equilibria in a one-state-variable setting with
8In the model employed here, where physical capital depreciates 100% in each time period, the marginal
propensity to consume out of current income is a constant. Moreover, it is the same constant in both equilibria.
Because income depends only on the inherited state variables—and therefore is not forward-looking—current
savings is the same in both equilibria.
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arbitrary NCTP. Finally, Tsur and Karp (2011) derive optimal climate policy while allowing
for arbitrary NCTP in a binary choice setting.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model. Section 3 solves for
optimal carbon policy under commitment and presents the main formula of the paper. Section
4 develops a solution strategy to solve the model using backward induction, then shows that
time inconsistency concerns are irrelevant in the considered model. Section 5 solves for
the corresponding Pigouvian taxes for the equilibria with and without commitment, then
compares these to the optimal carbon price. Section 6 calibrates the near-term SCC, and
section 7 concludes.
2 Model
The model is a simplified version of the integrated assessment model in Golosov et al. (2011).
The simplifications build on closely-related recent work by Gerlagh and Liski (2012). Unlike
Gerlagh and Liski (2012) we follow Golosov et al. (2011) in assuming that the elasticity
parameter in the damage function is stochastic. In addition, we allow decision-makers to
employ an arbitrary path of time preference rates.
2.1 Preferences, technology, and climate
Time is discrete and runs from t = 1, . . . , T . The time horizon is initially finite, though we
later consider the infinite-horizon limit. There is assumed to be a representative household
in each period who derives utility from the time path of consumption. Future utility is
discounted using a known sequence of potentially non-constant discount factors {βj}. For
each j, 0 < βj < 1. We are typically interested in the case in which the pure rate of
time preference (PRTP) declines weakly in time, thus where {βj} increases, though it is not
necessary to assume this for our results. For each time horizon s periods ahead, we define a
cumulative discount factor R(s) =
∏s
j=1 βj . This gives the utility value today of an extra unit
of utility received s periods from now. By assumption, R(0) = 1. Household preferences in
different periods are initially assumed to be identical; nevertheless, in section 4.3 we consider
the case in which each generation has its own distinct path of time preference rates.
The utility function of the representative household in generation t is
Et
T−t∑
s=0
R(s) ln(Ct+s).
Et is the mathematical expectation conditional on information available in period t. Prefer-
ences are logarithmic.
The economy has two sectors: a final-goods sector and an energy extraction sector. Energy
is an input in the final-goods sector. Carbon emissions arise as an externality associated with
energy production. Units are selected so Zt denotes both fossil fuel consumption in the energy
sector and carbon emissions. Atmospheric carbon accumulates according to
St =
t−1∑
k=1
(1− dk)Zt−k, (2.1)
where 1 − dk is the k-period-ahead carbon depreciation rate. It is the fraction of a unit of
carbon emissions that remains in the atmosphere k periods after it is emitted.
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Cumulative emissions lead to climate damages that impact economic output through a
multiplicative damage function that takes the following “exponential–linear” form:
ω(St) = exp(−γtSt). (2.2)
γt is an elasticity that denotes the percent output loss associated with an extra unit of
atmospheric carbon. It follows a known Markov process that is assumed to be bounded9.
Output in the final-goods sector, net of environmental damages and abatement costs, is
determined by an aggregate production function that takes the following form:
Yt = K
α
t At(Et, N1,t)ω(St). (2.3)
Capital, Kt, enters in a Cobb-Douglass manner. In addition, output depends on an unspeci-
fied energy-labor composite function, At(·, ·), and on climate damages, ω(·).
In addition, output in the energy extraction sector is determined by the following pro-
duction function:
Et = Gt(Zt, N2,t). (2.4)
Both At(·, ·) and Gt(·, ·) are left unspecified. This is done because the main formula derived in
the paper does not depend on the specific functional forms assumed for them. Both At(·, ·)
and Gt(·, ·) are also allowed to depend on time to reflect potential technological change.
Production in the energy sector depends on labor in addition to fossil fuels. Labor is mobile
between sectors and satisfies the constaint
Nt = N1,t +N2,t. (2.5)
Golsov et al. (2012) further assume that capital and energy are mobile across sectors, but
we follow Gerlagh and Liski (2012) in abstracting from this additional complexity.
To close the model, we need to specify an aggregate resource constraint for the final-goods
sector. We assume that physical capital depreciates 100% in each period10. This implies
Yt = Ct +Kt+1. (2.6)
Output each period is allocated between consumption and next period’s capital stock.
The model resembles the Brock-Mirman optimal growth example with log utility, Cobb
Douglass production, and 100% depreciation (Ljungqvist and Sargent 2004, Brock and Mir-
man 1973). This model is often used to motivate the “guess and verify” method for dynamic
programming because the value function takes an extremely simple analytical form—linear
in the log of capital . As we will see, the model here gives rise to value functions that are
also analytically tractable.
2.2 The planner’s problem with commitment
We initially consider the problem in which a decision-maker (or planner) in the initial period
employs a commitment device. This enables them to choose the entire time path of state-
contingent policies to be implemented by subsequent generations. Since the first-period
9Boundedness ensures that all relevant expectations are finite.
10Golosov et al. (2011) ostensibly allow for incomplete depreciation, but only in the section of their paper
in which household savings behavior is described by a constant savings rate. In the portion of their paper
in which households maximize intertemporal utility, the same 100% depreciation rate is assumed. This is an
extreme assumption that is only partly offset by the fact that the period length in the model is taken to be a
decade.
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decision-maker seeks to maximize its own utility, it fixes the path of time preference rates in
the way that it prefers given its own time perspective. In sequence form, the problem is
max
{kt+1,zt}
E1
T∑
t=1
R(t− 1) ln(ct),
subject to (2.1), (2.2), (2.3), (2.4), (2.5) and (2.6),
as well as non-negativity constraints on consumption and capital.
3 The optimal carbon price with commitment
In this section, we derive a formula for the first period carbon price when a decision maker
in that period has a commitment device. The formula is the central result of the paper. As
we show in the next section, it gives the near-term carbon price not only when there is a
commitment device, but also when concerns about time inconsistency are fully accounted for.
To solve for the optimal carbon price, we exploit some tractable analytical features of
the model. The same features are emphasized in Gerlagh and Liski (2012). Those authors
show, with quasi-hyperbolic discounting, that a symmetric Markov perfect equilibrium exists
for which the equilibrium value function is linear in the log of capital and linear in prior
emissions11. The same general analytical structure is preserved in our setting when the full
commitment problem is solved under NCTP. It is also preserved when the model is solved
using backward induction.
Before presenting the result, we define some notation. Let R(l,m) =
∏m
j=l βj be the
cumulative discount factor between period l and period m + 1. It is the price at date l of a
unit of utility to be received at date m+ 1. For convenience, we define R(j, k) ≡ 1 anytime
k ≤ j. For n > m, the cumulative discount factor can be decomposed:
R(n) ≡ R(1, n) = R(1,m)R(m+ 1, n).
Proposition 1 Consider the planner’s problem under commitment described in section 2.2.
In the limit as the time horizon goes to infinity, the optimal carbon tax in period 1 is12
Fz(1)
Y1
= E1
[ ∞∑
k=1
R(k)γ1+k(1− dk) · Γ(k)
]
, (3.1)
where
Γ(k) =
∑∞
m=0 α
mR(k + 1, k +m)∑∞
n=0 α
nR(n)
.
Proof. We fix the path of discount factors at those preferred by the initial generation, then
apply finite horizon dynamic programming. Because the time horizon is finite, the problem
is nonstationary, so the value function is indexed at each time step by the number of periods
remaining. The number of periods remaining is indicated by a superscript on the value
function.
11Gerlagh and Liski (2012) assume that future damages are deterministic, while we assume that the elasticity
of future damages follows a known stochastic process.
12Fz(1) is shorthand for the partial derivative of the final-goods production function with respect to fossil
fuel input Z; the “1” indicates that all variables are evaluated at their period 1 values.
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Before starting, we simplify notation. The energy-labor composite function can be viewed
as a function ofN1t, N2t and Zt. For convenience, we denote this by E˜(Zt, N1t) ≡ At(Gt(Zt, N2t), N1t).
Given N1t, N2t is redundant by (2.5), so we suppress it in the notation. We also suppress
the time subscript on E˜.
In the last period, the optimal policy is KT+1 = 0 and ZT = Z¯, where Z¯ is the maximum
feasible rate of fossil fuel consumption (which is assumed to bind in the last period only).
This implies
V (0)(KT , ST , γT ) = ln[K
α
T E˜(N1t, Z¯)ω(ST )]
= αln(KT ) + ln(E˜(N1t, Z¯))−
T−1∑
j=1
γT (1− dj)ZT−j .
In T − 1,
V (1)(KT−1, ST−1, γT−1) = maxKT ,ZT−1 ln[K
α
T−1E˜(N1t, ZT−1)ω(ST−1)−KT ]
+ βT−1ET−1
. . .+ αln(KT )− T−1∑
j=1
γT (1− dj)ZT−j
 .
Throughout, “. . . ” indicates inessential constants. Taking first-order conditions and substi-
tuting gives
V (1)(KT−1, ST−1, γT−1) = . . .+ α(1 + αβT−1)ln(KT−1)
−
T−2∑
m=1
{(1 + αβT−1)γT−1(1− dm) + βT−1(1− dm+1)ET−1[γT ]}ZT−m−1.
This implies the following value function coefficients when j = 1:
θ1 = α(1 + αβT−1) (3.2)
and
ζm,1 = (1 + αβT−1)γT−1(1− dm) + βT−1(1− dm+1)ET−1[γT ]. (3.3)
Next, proceeding by induction, suppose the value function takes the following form when
there are j ≥ 1 periods remaining:
V (j)(KT−j , ST−j , γT−j) = Γj + θjln(KT−j)−
T−j−1∑
m=1
ζm,jZT−j−m. (3.4)
The problem in period T − (j + 1) is then
V (j+1)(KT−j−1, ST−j−1, γT−j−1) = max
KT−j ,ZT−j−1
ln(KαT−j−1E˜(N1t, ZT−j−1)ω(ST−j−1)−KT−j)
+βT−j−1ET−j−1[. . .+ θjln(KT−j)−
T−j−1∑
m=1
ζm,jZT−j−m].
Taking first-order conditions and simplifying gives
V (j+1)(KT−j−1, ST−j−1, γT−j−1) = . . .+ α(1 + βT−j−1θj) ln(KT−j−1)
−
T−j−2∑
m=1
{(1 + βT−j−1θj)γT−j−1(1− dm) + βT−j−1ET−j−1[ζm+1,j ]}Zt−j−1−m.
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This confirms the inductive hypothesis. It also implies the following recursive equations that
can be used to construct the value function coefficients:
θj+1 = α(1 + βT−j−1θj) (3.5)
and
ζm,j+1 = (1 + βT−j−1θj)γT−j−1(1− dm) + βT−j−1ET−j−1[ζm+1,j ]. (3.6)
Iterating on (3.5) starting from (3.2) gives
θj = α
[
1 +
j∑
k=1
(
k−1∏
l=0
αβT−j+l
)]
. (3.7)
Iterating on (3.6) starting from (3.3), applying the Law of Iterated Expectations, gives
ζm,j =
j−1∑
k=0
(k−1∏
l=0
βT−j+l
)1 + j−k∑
n=1
n−1∏
p=0
αβT−j+p+k
 (1− dm+k)ET−j [γT−j+k] (3.8)
+
j−1∏
q=0
βT−j+q(1− dm+j)ET−j [γT ]. (3.9)
Next, taking the first-order condition with respect to Z1 for the first period problem gives
Fz(1)
Y1
=
β1E1[ζ1,T−2]∑T−1
n=0 α
nR(n)
.
Taking the limit as the time horizon goes to infinity gives (3.1).
Equation (3.1) shows that the optimal carbon price as a fraction of output is a constant
that depends only on the expected value of the future damage elasticities, on the carbon
cycle parameters, and on the path of time preference rates. Notably, the formula does not
depend on the endogenous paths for carbon stocks, output, or consumption. As discussed
in the introduction, this peculiar finding is a consequence of the combined assumptions that
utility is logarithmic and damages the assumed multiplicative form.
The formula demonstrates a form of certainty equivalence that is noted also in Golosov
et al. (2011). In particular, the only feature of uncertainty about future damages that affects
the current decision is the expected value of the future elasticity parameter conditional on
the information set today. It follows that fat-tailed damages affect the optimal carbon tax in
this model only so far as they affect the expected value of future realizations of the damage
parameter13.
To develop intuition for the formula, it is useful to consider the case in which time
preference rates are constant: βj = β for all j. In this case, the numerator and denominator
in the ratio term on the right-hand side of (3.1) are equal, so the term equals one. The overall
expression then reduces to
Fz(1)
Y1
= E1
[ ∞∑
k=1
βkγ1+k(1− dk)
]
. (3.10)
13See Weitzman (2009) and Nordhaus (2011) for further discussion of the potential implications of “fat-
tailed” uncertainty for climate policy.
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This is identical to the carbon price formula presented in Proposition 1 of Golosov et al.
(2011)14. The finding that the two formulas coincide is unexpected since the models differ
somewhat. These differences do not matter for determining the near-term carbon price.
The intuition for the carbon price in (3.10) is straightforward. γ1+k is the elasticity of
damages (as a fraction of output) with respect to an extra unit of atmospheric carbon k
periods ahead. Meanwhile, 1− dk is the fraction of an extra unit of period 1 emissions that
remain in the atmostphere in k periods. The product of the two terms gives the k-period-
ahead damages (as a fraction of output) that can be attributed to an extra unit of emissions
in period 1. It follows that the right-hand side of (3.10) is the marginal externality cost of
emissions, and also, as Golosov et al. (2011) show, the Pigouvian tax.
In moving from constant discounting to hyperbolic discounting, one might expect the
equilibrium carbon price to take the same form, obtained by replacing the cumulative discount
factor in (3.10) with the cumulative discount factor under hyperbolic discounting: i.e., replace
βk with R(k). But formula (3.1) shows that in fact the so-far-ignored Γ(k) terms create a
wedge between this naive formulation and the optimal carbon price. It is easy to show that
the Γ(k) terms make the carbon price bigger.
To see this, compare the sums in the numerator and the denominator of Γ(k). R(k +
1, k + m) gives the cumulative discount factor between period k + 1 and period k + m + 1,
a span of m periods. R(1, n) gives the cumulative discount factor between period 1 and
period n + 1, a span of n periods. Comparing term by term (equating the indices m and
n) the covered spans are the same. The difference is that the cumulative discount factors in
the numerator select sections of the discount factor sequence that are further in the future.
Under constant discounting, this doesn’t matter (i.e., the ratio equals one). But when time
preference rates decline, the cumulative discount factor terms in the numerator are larger.
Therefore, a sufficient condition for∑∞
m=0 α
mR(k + 1, k +m)∑∞
n=0 α
nR(1, n)
> 1
is for discount rates to decline weakly in all periods and to decline strictly in at least one.
4 Time inconsistency irrelevance
In deriving the formula for the carbon price in equation (3.1), we assumed that decision-
makers in the initial period could use a commitment device. But if future decisions are
instead modeled in a way that is consistent with the preferences (and time perspective) of
the agents living at that time, then the expected future trajectory of the climate-economy
system will change in ways that would typically affect the optimal choice of carbon policy
today. Despite this expectation, we show in this section that the optimal first-period carbon
price is unchanged when we solve instead using backward induction. In particular, the optimal
carbon price under backward induction is also given by equation (3.1). We further show that
this result continues to hold no matter what one assumes about the time preference structure
of future generations.
14One small difference arises because Golosov et al. (2011) have emissions affect damages immediately,
while we follow Gerlagh and Liski (2012) in having the initiation of damages be delayed one period. In effect,
∂St
∂Zt
= 0 in our formulation, while it is allowed to be positive in Golosov et al. (2011). When Golosov et al.
(2011) calibrate their model to match the Nordhaus (2008) carbon cycle as closely as possible, they assume
∂St
∂Zt
= 0 (in which case their formula matches (3.10) exactly).
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Our finding implies that time consistency concerns can be safely ignored when applying
the carbon price formula provided in the paper. When the model is calibrated in section 6,
the period length is taken to be a decade. Since the current policy regime cannot plausibly
commit action beyond that span of time15, the information contained in the the first-period
carbon price is all the current policy regime needs to know to justify current decisions.
4.1 Time Consistent Backward Induction
To solve the problem without commitment, we present an algorithm that can be used to solve
for the backward induction equilibrium in a finite horizon model in which decision-makers
employ an arbitrary path of PRTPs.
4.1.1 Algorithm
We illustrate the algorithm using a fairly generic dynamic model. We assume that enough
assumptions have been placed on the model to ensure that the Strotz-Pollak equilibrium
exists and is unique. This is a strong assumption, but it suffices for our purposes because we
can demonstrate that this holds for the model considered in the paper.
Time runs from t = 1, . . . , T . A control vector z is chosen in each period, and a state
vector S evolves according to the following transition equation: St+1 = G(St, zt). There is
no commitment device, so the decision maker each period controls only the current decision.
Agents are identical, and they each employ the same sequence of (nonconstant) discount
factors {βt}. The payoff each period is given by the return function h(S, z).
Throughout, V denotes the continuation value from the perspective of the contempora-
neous generation. Superscripts indicate the number of periods remaining. In the last period,
the Bellman equation for the last period decision maker is
V (0)(S) = max
z
h(S, z).
In period T-1, the contemporaneous decision-maker solves
V (1)(S) = max
z
[
h(S, z) + β1V
(0)(G(S, z))
]
. (4.1)
This can be used to generate the corresponding policy function z = φ1(S). Note that V
(1)(S)
captures the continuation value from the perspective of the period T-1 decision maker, but not
the relevant continuation value from the perspective of earlier generations. For example, the
decision-maker in T −2 would apply β2 in place of β1 in (4.1) to get the relevant continuation
value. Similarly, the decision-maker in T − 3 would apply β3 in place of β1.
To account for the distinct time perspective of agents in each prior period, we construct
an “auxiliary value function” for each16. As a matter of notation, W
(j)
t (S) will denote the
continuation value with j periods remaining as viewed from the perspective of a decision
maker in period t < T − j. For the T −1 period problem, there are T −2 such auxiliary value
15For example, there was widespread support for the Kyoto protocol when it was initially adopted in 1997,
but twelve years later, the international community was unable to negotiate a compelling continuation treaty
at the Copenhagen Climate Summit.
16The term “auxiliary value function” is adopted in Harris and Laibson (2001). Our usage of the term is
related but distinct.
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functions. They are constructed as follows17:
W
(1)
T−2 (S) = h (S, φ1 (S)) + β2V
(0) [G(S, φ1 (S))]
W
(1)
T−3 (S) = h (S, φ1 (S)) + β3V
(0) [G(S, φ1 (S))]
...
W
(1)
1 (S) = h (S, φ1 (S)) + βT−1V
(0) [G(S, φ1 (S))] .
Next, consider the problem in T − 2. Again, start with the contemporaneous decision
maker.
V (2) (S) = max
z
[
h (S, z) + β1W
(1)
T−2 [G(S, z)]
]
.
Note that the relevant continuation value for a decision-maker in T − 2 is the auxiliary value
function W
(1)
T−2. Solving this problem gives the period T −2 policy function z = φ2 (S). This
in turn is used to construct the auxiliary value functions associated with the continuation
value from T − 2 forward:
W
(2)
T−3 (S) = h (S, φ2 (S)) + β2W
(1)
T−3 [G(S, z)]
...
W
(2)
1 (S) = h (S, φ2 (S)) + βT−2W
(1)
1 [G(S, z)] .
The procedure is repeated until arriving in period 1. At that point,
V (T−1) (S) = max
z
[
h (S, z) + β1W
(T−2)
1 [G(S, z)]
]
.
4.2 The optimal carbon price without commitment
The algorithm just described can be used to solve for the sequence of policy functions along
the Strotz-Pollak equilibrium path, including the equilibrium carbon policy in period one.
Doing so leads to the following result.
Proposition 2 Consider the abatement problem described in section 2 and assume a com-
mitment device is unavailable. The first period carbon price calculated along the Strotz-Pollak
equilibrium path is the same as found in the problem with full commitment. In both cases,
the optimal first period carbon price in the infinite horizon limit of the model is given by
expression (3.1).
Proof. The proof resembles that of proposition 1. As there, we work backwards from the
initial period. The key difference is that we employ the backward induction algorithm from
section 4.1, rather than simply imposing the path of discount factors that would be applied
by a first period decision maker.
In the last period, KT+1 = 0 and Z = Z¯, so
V (0)(KT , ST , γT ) = αln(KT ) + ln(E˜(N1t, Z¯))−
T−1∑
j=1
γT (1− dj)ZT−j .
17When using this approach as a numerical algorithm, it is worth noting that the auxiliary value functions
can be constructed without any additional optimization steps.
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Because no discount factor is used to construct this value function, the corresponding auxiliary
value functions are identical:
W
(0)
t (KT , ST , γT ) = V
(0)(KT , ST , γT ), t = 1, . . . , T − 1.
In T − 1, the value function (for a contemporaneous decision maker) solves
V (1)(KT−1, ST−1, γT−1) = maxKT ,ZT−1 ln[K
α
T−1E˜(N1t, ZT−1)ω(ST−1)−KT ] + β1ET−1W (0)T−1(KT , ST , γT )
= maxKT ,ZT−1 ln[K
α
T−1E˜(N1t, ZT−1)ω(ST−1)−KT ]
+ β1ET−1
αln(KT ) + ln(E˜(N1t, 0))− T−1∑
j=1
γT (1− dj)ZT−j
 .
The first-order conditions for KT and ZT−1 imply
KT =
αβ1
1 + αβ1
YT−1 (4.2)
and
E˜z(N1t, Z
∗
T−1)
E˜(N1t, Z∗T−1)
=
β1(1− dj)ET−1[γT ]
1 + αβ1
. (4.3)
Conditional on information available in T − 1, Z∗T−1 can be viewed as a constant that is
independent of KT−1 and ST−1. Substituting and simplifying gives
V (1)(KT−1, ST−1, γT−1)
= ln[
1
1 + αβ1
YT−1] + αβ1ln(
αβ1
1 + αβ1
YT−1) + β1ln(E˜(N1t, 0))− β1
T−1∑
m=1
(1− dm)ET−1[γT ]ZT−m
= . . .+ α(1 + αβ1)ln(KT−1)−
T−2∑
m=1
{(1 + αβ1)γT−1(1− dm) + β1(1− dm+1)ET−1[γT ]}ZT−m−1.
To construct the corresponding auxiliary value function for t < T − 1, we again use (4.2) and
(4.3), but we change the discount factor applied between T − 1 and T from β1 to βT−t. We
would also change the next period auxiliary value function, but in this case, it is unnecessary
because they are the same. Substituting and simplifying gives
W
(1)
t (KT−1, ST−1, γT−1)
= ln[
1
1 + αβ1
YT−1] + αβT−tln(
αβ1
1 + αβ1
YT−1) + βT−tln(E˜(N1t, 0))− βT−t
T−1∑
m=1
(1− dm)ET−1[γT ]ZT−m
= . . .+ α(1 + αβT−t)ln(KT−1)−
T−2∑
m=1
{(1 + αβT−t)γT−1(1− dm) + βT−t(1− dm+1)ET−1[γT ]}ZT−m−1.
Note that β1, carried over from the policy rule chosen by the T − 1 decision-maker, ends up
in the constant term (indicated here by “. . .”).
The rest of the proof proceeds by induction. The hypothesis is that the date T − j
continuation value, viewed from the perspective of t < T − j, takes the form
W
(j)
t (KT−j , ST−j) = Γ
t
j + θ
t
jln(KT−j)−
T−j−1∑
m=1
ζtm,jZT−j−m.
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The coefficients depend on the number of periods remaining (including information that
becomes available in that period), and they depend on the time perspective, “t”.
The hypothesis is confirmed for j = 1 by the initial analysis above. In that case, the value
function coefficients are
θt1 = α(1 + αβT−t) (4.4)
and
ζtm,1 = (1 + αβT−t)γT−1(1− dm) + βT−t(1− dm+1)ET−1[γT ]. (4.5)
Next, consider the problem for a decision-maker at date T − (j + 1).
V (j+1)(KT−j−1, ST−j−1, γT−j−1) = max
KT−j ,ZT−j−1
ln(KαT−j−1E˜(N1t, ZT−j−1)ω(ST−j−1)−KT−j)
+ β1ET−j−1[ΓT−j−1j + θ
T−j−1
j ln(KT−j)−
T−j−1∑
m=1
ζT−j−1m,j zT−j−m].
Taking first-order conditions and simplifying gives
V (j+1)(KT−j−1, ST−j−1, γT−j−1)
= . . .+ ln(
1
1 + β1θ
T−j−1
j
YT−j−1)
+ β1ET−j−1[ΓT−j−1j + θ
T−j−1
j ln(
β1θ
T−j−1
j
1 + β1θ
T−j−1
j
yT−j−1)−
T−j−1∑
m=1
ζT−j−1m,j zT−j−m]
= . . .+ α(1 + β1θ
T−j−1
j ) ln(KT−j−1)
−
T−j−2∑
m=1
{(1 + β1θT−j−1j )γT−j−1(1− dm) + β1ET−j−1[ζT−j−1m+1,j ]}Zt−j−1−m.
To construct the corresponding auxiliary value functions for t < T − (j + 1), continue to use
the first-order conditions from the problem above, but replace β1 with βT−j−t and replace
W
(j)
T−j−1(KT−j , ST−j , γT−j) with W
(j)
t (KT−j , ST−j , γT−j).
W
(j+1)
t (KT−j−1, ST−j−1, γT−j−1)
= . . .+ ln(
1
1 + β1θ
T−j
j
YT−j−1) + βT−j−tET−j−1[Γtj + θtjln(
β1θ
T−j
j
1 + β1θ
T−j
j
yT−j−1)−
T−j−1∑
m=1
ζtm,jZT−j−m]
= . . .+ α(1 + βT−j−tθtj) ln(KT−j−1)
−
T−j−2∑
m=1
{(1 + βT−j−tθtj)γT−j−1(1− dm) + βT−j−tET−j−1[ζtm+1,j ]}Zt−j−1−m.
The coefficients are
θtj+1 = α(1 + βT−j−tθ
t
j) (4.6)
and
ζtm,j+1 = (1 + βT−j−tθ
t
j)γT−j−1(1− dm) + βT−j−tET−j−1[ζtm+1,j ]. (4.7)
This shows that the relevant auxiliary value function coefficients for a decision maker in a
given period t is determined by an independent recursive system. Fixing the time perspective
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at t = 1, it is easy to see that θ11 from (4.4) equals θ1 from (3.2) and ζ
1
m,1 from (4.5) equals
ζm,1 from (3.3). Moreover, the recursive relationship for θ
1
j and ζ
1
m,j in (4.6) and (4.7) is
the same as the recursive relationship for θj and ζm,j in (3.5) and (3.6). It follows that the
continuation value relevant to the first-period decision differs across the equilibrium scenarios
by at most a constant18. Since the constant term in the value function does not affect the
optimal policy decision, it follows that the optimal carbon price chosen by an agent in the
first period is the same in the two equilibria.
The proposition shows that the general formula for the first period carbon price in (3)
is robust to concerns about time inconsistency. This finding is strengthened in the next
subsection. But before presenting that, we first discuss an interpretation of the equilibrium
derived in Gerlagh and Liski (2012) that is implied by Proposition 2.
Gerlagh and Liski (2012) solve for a symmetric Markov perfect equilibrium under which
the policy functions are characterized by a particularly simple simple form: the optimal
choice of capital in t+ 1 is linear in output at date t and the marginal product of final goods
production with respect to fossil fuel inputs in t is linear in period t consumption. (Indeed,
our equilibrium takes the same form.) In general, one would expect there to be multiple
symmetric Markov perfect equilibria, and Gerlagh and Liski (2012) do not show that the
symmetric Markov perfect equilibrium for which they solve is unique; rather, they motivate
their particular equilibrium on the grounds that the simplicity might appeal to policy-makers.
Proposition 2 can be viewed as strengthening the Gerlagh and Liski (2012) result because it
can be shown to imply that the symmetric Markov perfect equilibrium in Gerlagh and Liksi
(2012) is also the unique Strotz-Pollak equilibrium. Thus, their equilibrium is not just one
arbitrary time consistent equilibrium among many; rather, it is the unique one that clearly
respects the order of decision makers in the timeline.
To compare the carbon price formula in Lemma 4 of Gerlagh and Liski (2012) with
the formula here, it is necessary to assume in their model (as we do) that ∆y = 1 and
∆u = 0. In addition, because they assume that the damage function elasticity parameter is a
known constant, we rewrite the damage function in the following “generic” form to facilitate
comparison:
ω(St) = exp(−
t−1∑
k=1
φkZt−k).
Then setting the discount factors to (ρ, θ, θ, . . .), where θ > ρ, the first period carbon price
reduces to the following in both papers:
Fz(1)
Y1
=
ρ
1 + α(ρ− θ)
∞∑
k=1
θk−1φk. (4.8)
4.3 Strong irrelevance
The “irrelevance” result from Proposition 2 can be strengthened. In resolving time inconsis-
tency, Proposition 2 stepped away from the assumption of a commitment device by solving
instead for the backward induction solution when decision makers in every period are identi-
cal. But anticipating the preferences of future generations is a notoriously difficult problem
(Beltratti, Chichilnisky and Heal 1998) and one could plausibly maintain a wide variety of
18In fact, though it is not tracked explicitly in the writing of the proof shown here, the constant term is higher
under commitment. This means that the wealth level of the first period agent is higher with commitment
then without.
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possible assumptions about the structure of time preferences to be applied by future gen-
erations. The following result shows that the initial period carbon price is unchanged no
matter what one assumes about the path of time preference rates to be employed by future
generations. It ensures that the carbon price in Proposition 1 is robust to time inconsistency
concerns in the strongest possible way.
Proposition 3 Consider the abatement problem described in section 2 and assume a com-
mitment device is unavailable. Assume further that agents in different time periods have their
own path of time preference rates, which could differ in arbitrary ways across generations.
Then first period carbon price calculated along the Strotz-Pollak equilibrium path is the same
as found with full commitment. In the infinite horizon limit, it is given by expression (3.1).
Proof. The proof is identical to that of Proposition 2 with some notational changes to allow
for an arbitrary of path of discount factors for each later generation. The result follows from
the fact that the discount factors used by later generations, which get embedded into each
period’s policy function, end up in the constant term of the auxiliary value function for earlier
generations. As a result, while these subsequent decisions (and the path of discount factors
that motivate them) affect the wealth level of earlier decision-makers, they do not affect the
optimal choice of carbon policy in the initial period.
4.4 The role of simplifying assumptions
It is worth considering the importance, for our results, of the simplifying assumptions that
we maintain relative to Golosov et al. (2011). As discussed, we simplify in two ways. First,
by treating the stock of fossil fuels as infinite, and second by simplifying production in the
energy sector.
First note that none of these features of the model appear in the carbon price formula
derived in Golosov et al. (2011). So they do not affect the near-term carbon price under
constant discounting. Of course, the way in which energy production and resource scarcity
are modeled does affect the long-term dynamic path of the climate-economy system, but these
changes do not bare on our results. The question is if something in the nature of backward
induction with hyperbolic agents would create a mechanism under which these features of
the model would start to matter for the near-term carbon price. We do not see a case for
such a mechanism.
For the assumption regarding production in the energy extraction sector, we think this
point is particularly clear. In particular, as in the full Golosov et al. (2011) model with
constant discounting, our formula depends only loosely on the assumptions regarding pro-
duction in the energy sector and the way in which energy gets incorporated into final-goods
production. In particular, the derived formula allows for arbitrary functional forms for both
the energy sector production function and the labor-energy composite function in final-goods
production. Since the details of these functional forms do not in any way matter for deter-
mining the near-term carbon price, it is hard to see why it would suddenly matter—and only
for the hyperbolic case—when energy production is assumed to also depend on capital.
Of course, these arguments comprise only a conjecture. One could defend the conjecture
numerically. In particular, we could use finite-horizon dynamic programming to solve numer-
ically for the near-term carbon price with commitment, then use the algorithm from section
4.1.1 to solve numerically for the carbon price without commitment. To do so, we would need
to specify functional forms for the energy sector production function and the energy-labor
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composite in final-goods production. The exercise would therefore only prove the conjecture
for the considered scenarios. To accomplish this, the suggested numerical problems would
involve a four-dimensional state space. The numerical problems are likely feasible, but it
would be challenging, and we view it as outside the scope of the current paper.
5 Pigouvian taxes
A Pigouvian tax would set the tax on carbon equal to the marginal externality cost of
emissions, with future costs discounted at a rate that is consistent with the equilibrium
real return on capital. The relevant utility discount factor in period t, which we denote φt,
depends on the equilibrium path of consumption as follows19
u′(Ct) = φtEtu′(Ct+1)Fk(Kt+1, Nt+1, St+1, γt+1).
Log utility and the fact that final-goods production is Cobb Douglass in capital implies
φt =
1
α
· Et
[
Ct+1
Yt+1
· Kt+1
Ct
]
. (5.1)
Since the relevant discount rate depends on the equilibrium path of consumption, the
calculated Pigouvian tax depends on which equilibrium is considered. Since our analysis
compares two equilibria, we compute two Pigouvian taxes.
5.0.1 Pigouvian tax with commitment
To derive the period one Pigouvian tax corresponding to the equilibrium with commitment,
we combine equation (5.1) with the full commitment equilibrium savings rule20:
Kt+1 =
βtθT−t−1
1 + βtθT−t−1
Yt
and
Ct =
1
1 + βtθT−t−1
Yt.
It follows that
Kt+1
Ct
= βtθT−t−1.
Moreover21,
Ct+1
Yt+1
=
1
1 + βt+1θT−t−2
=
α
θT−t−1
.
Substituting and simplifying yields
φt = βt,
19Our derivation builds on work in Gerlagh and Liski (2012). The setting differs somewhat since our model
is non-stationary and stochastic.
20The savings rule falls out from the proof of Proposition 1 with t = T − j − 1.
21The second equality follows from equation (3.5).
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which holds for all t. With commitment, the initial-period decision maker sets savings and
consumption decisions to ensure the marginal rate of substitution between adjacent periods,
viewed from the initial period, equals the marginal rate of transformation in equilibrium.
Since this is the same subjective discount factor that is applied when solving the full
commitment equilibrium, it follows that the period one Pigouvian tax and the period one
optimal carbon tax in the equilibrium with commitment are the same.
5.1 Pigouvian tax without commitment
For t < T , the savings rule in the no commitment equilibrium is22
Kt+1 =
ΩT−t
1 + ΩT−t
Yt, (5.2)
where
ΩT−t =
T−t∑
m=1
m∏
n=1
(αβn). (5.3)
Substituting into equation (5.1) as before gives
φt =
ΩT−t
α(1 + ΩT−t−1)
,
which can be simplified to give
φt = β1 · 1 + αβ2 + αβ2αβ3 + . . .+ αβ2 · · ·αβT−t
1 + αβ1 + αβ1αβ2 + . . .+ αβ1 · · ·αβT−t−1 > β1. (5.4)
In addition, it is easy to verify in the last period that φT−1 = β1.
Without commitment, the agent in control in period t discounts utility between t and
t+ 1 using the subjective discount factor β1. Provided the preferences of subsequent agents
aligned with their own, they would ensure that the expected marginal rate of transformation
equaled u
′(Ct)
β1u′(Ct+1) . This is the case in T −1 since the preferences of the generation in the very
last period align with those of agents in earlier periods (they consume everything, as prior
generations would have wanted). But for t < T − 1, it is not the case. The decision maker in
t saves more to account for the fact that subsequent decision-makers are going to save less
then they would have if the hyperbolic agent in t could force their hand with a commitment
device.
The more interesting question is to compare the Pigouvian discount rates, {φt}, with
the discount rates applied in the full commitment equilibrium, {βt}. Since the optimal
carbon price under commitment equals the optimal carbon price without commitment (from
Proposition 2) this comparison will make it possible to compare the optimal carbon price
without commitment to the Pigouvian tax without commitment.
Proposition 4 In the equilibrium without commitment, the relevant subjective discount fac-
tor for use in constructing the Pigouvian tax starts out above the corresponding discount
factor that would be applied under commitment, then declines monotonically. For large t, it
is below the subjective discount factor under commitment. In particular, φ1β1 > 1,
φT−1
βT−1 < 1,
and φt+1βt+1 ≤ φtβt for 1 ≤ t ≤ T − 1.
22The savings rule follows from the inductive step in the proof of proposition 2.
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Proof. That φ1β1 > 1 and
φT−1
βT−1 < 1 follows from inspection. To prove that
φt+1
βt+1 ≤ φtβt ,
suppose instead that φt+1βt+1 >
φt
βt . In particular, suppose
ΩT−t−1
αβt+1(1 + ΩT−t−2)
>
ΩT−t
αβt(1 + ΩT−t−1)
. (5.5)
Defining Ψn =
∏n
m=1 αβm, (5.5) can be rewritten as
ΩT−t−1
αβt+1(1 + ΩT−t−2)
>
ΩT−t−1 + ΨT−t
αβt(1 + ΩT−t−2 + ΨT−t−1)
.
Cross-multiplying, this is equivalent to
αβtΩT−t−1 + αβtΩT−t−1ΩT−t−2 + αβtΨT−t−1ΩT−t−1 >
αβt+1ΩT−t−1 + αβt+1ΩT−t−1ΩT−t−2 + αβt+1ΨT−t(1 + ΩT−t−2).
But αβt+1ΩT−t−1 ≥ αβtΩT−t−1, αβt+1ΩT−t−1ΩT−t−2 ≥ αβtΩT−t−1ΩT−t−2 and αβt+1ΨT−t(1+
ΩT−t−2) > αβtΨT−t−1ΩT−t−1, which gives a contradiction.
It follows that the relationship between the optimal first-period carbon tax and the first-
period Pigouvian tax in the equilibrium without commitment is ambiguous23. If climate
damages all happen immediately, the Pigouvian tax would be bigger. But if climate damages
occur with sufficient delay—more likely—the optimal carbon tax is bigger.
Gerlagh and Liski (2011) argue that the delay between emissions and damages in most
integrated assessment models is significantly greater than is implied under the Golosov et
al. (2011) carbon cycle. They derive an alternative motivation for the linear coefficients
in the Golosov et al. (2011) linear-exponential damage function. Their calibration of this
alternative model implies a much greater delay between emissions and damages than in
Golosov et al. (2011). Adopting the Gerlagh and Liski (2012) carbon cycle would imply a
greater separation between the optimal carbon tax and the Pigouvian tax then is found in
our quantitative results. As discussed in Gerlagh and Liski (2012), the wedge between the
optimal carbon tax and the Pigouvian tax reflects the commitment value24 of climate policy
when generations discount the future hyperbolically. In particular, the long delay between
climate-related investments and the corresponding payoffs provides a mechanism to transfer
wealth across generations in a way that partially leapfrogs intermediate generations whose
intertemporal preferences don’t align with those of earlier generations.
6 Quantitative analysis
6.1 Calibration of time preference rates
An advantage of having an explicit formula is that it is easy to compare the effect of alterna-
tive specifications. The introduction mentioned three justifications for DRTP. The first was
behavioral evidence showing that the observed choice behavior of many individuals is consis-
tent with a hyperbolic discounting function (Frederick et al. 2002). A number of papers in
macroeconomics use this evidence to calibrate a declining path of time preference rates (For
example, Laibson 1997 and Barro 1999). It is not clear, however, how this evidence should be
23Gerlagh and Liski (2012) make the same point.
24As Gerlagh and Liski (2012) note, the commitment value in this case is analogous to Laibson’s finding
that commitment devices have value in self-control problems (Laibson, 2007).
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Figure 1: Comparison of alternative hyperbolic discounting paths.
used when evaluating public sector projects (Guo et al. 2006). The trouble is that empirical
studies that estimate the parameters of a hyperbolic discounting function imply very high
short-run discount rates. For example, in Barro (1999), the continuous path of PRTPs starts
at 50%. Thus, even though the appropriate rate may decline to near zero in the very long
run (Cropper et al. 1994) the analysis would be overwhelmed by the very high initial rates.
We focus instead on the other justifications for DRTP, in part because the Golosov et al.
(2011) model is a convenient setting in which to consider them. We compare four calibrations,
presented in figure 1. Each can be interpreted either through the uncertainty lens, under
which the “correct” time preference rate is a random variable with a known probability
distribution, or through the aggregation lens, where the assumed distribution reflects the
distribution of views in society. For simplicity, we adopt the uncertainty lens when describing
assumptions.
The first three scenarios reflect the high-profile debate in the economics of climate change
between Nordhaus (2008) and Stern. Nordhaus (2008) argues that the PRTP and the elas-
ticity of marginal utility should be jointly calibrated to ensure that the savings decisions
of households in the model are consistent with the real return on capital—about 5.5% in
Nordhaus (2008). Under log utility, this implies a PRTP of 3.0% in DICE. Stern (2007),
in contrast, argues that the intergenerational distributional consequences of this assumption
are too extreme when applied to climate change. On ethical grounds, he argues that the
PRTP under log utility should be 0.1%. Our goal is not to resolve this debate. Rather, we
consider a variety of scenarios for the probability distribution that a global decision-maker
today might assign to these competing perspectives. The scenarios attribute respectively 1%,
5%, and 10% weight to the Stern model, with the remaining weight assigned to Nordhaus.
We do not offer a deep reason for viewing the Stern rate as dramatically less probable then
the Nordhaus rate, though we suspect that a review of general-interest economics journals
would reveal a strong preference for the Nordhaus view. More importantly, our scenarios
show that the effect of entertaining even a small chance that the Stern rate is correct (or
putting a small weight on those members of society who think it is) can be large.
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The final calibration builds on the expert elicitation survey in Weitzman (2001). To mo-
tivate his calculation of DRTP, Weitzman (2001) surveyed over 2000 professional economists,
asking for their “professionally considered gut opinion” about the best discount rate to use
in cost benefit analysis for climate policy. Weitzman’s survey is the closest thing we have
to an expert elicitation study for climate change discounting that is representative for the
economics profession. A problem with applying his results to the current situation is that he
looks at consumption discount rates, while we are interested in the PRTP25. The celebrated
Ramsey formula, derived from the first-order conditions for the optimal consumption path
in the Ramsey growth model, shows that the (instantaneous) consumption discount rate is
comprised by the sum of two terms: the PRTP and the product of the consumption growth
rate and the elasticity of marginal utility. Provided future growth is positive, the consump-
tion discount rate is bigger than the PRTP. It is therefore reasonable to view Weitzman’s
distribution as a conservative estimate of the distribution of PRTPs26.
As noted in the introduction, the strong irrelevance result in proposition 3 strengthens
the case for this calibration procedure. The main critique leveled against the calculation
of certainty-equivalent discount rates in Weitzman (2001)—see, for example, Newell and
Pizer (2003)—is that it hinges on the assumption that current uncertainty (or the current
distribution of views) is static. But this criticism does not apply when Weitzman’s argument
is used in the context of the integrated assessment model here. In this case, even if one
expects uncertainty (or the distribution of views) to change over time, which presumably it
must, these changes do not matter for determining current policy.
6.2 Calibration of the carbon cycle and damages
To calibrate our damage function, we follow Golosov et al. (2011). Those authors assume
that the expected value of the future damage elasticity parameter, conditional on information
today, is the same for all future periods. Moreover, they calibrate their damage function to
coincide with two data points from a meta analysis of damages in Nordhaus (2000). The first
calibration point estimates that a 2.5 degree Celsius increase in mean global temperature
would lead to a 0.48% loss of GWP. In addition, they allow for a 6.8% chance that damages
from a 6 degree rise in temperatures would be catastrophic, leading to a 30% loss of GWP.
These considerations imply an expected damage elasticity of 2.379× 10−5.
Our calibration of the carbon cycle follows Golosov et al. (2011) with two adjustments.
They calibrate the decay structure of atmospheric carbon dioxide to be consistent with recent
evidence that the geometric decay structure in most climate policy models is incorrect. The
revised scientific understanding of atmospheric carbon decay is provided in the following
quote from the IPCC (IPCC 2007), which is included in Golosov et al. (2011): “About half
of a CO2 pulse to the atmosphere is removed over a timescale of 30 years; a further 30% is
removed within a few centuries; and the remaining 20% will typically stay in the atmosphere
for many thousands of years”. To replicate this, they assume that fraction φ0 of emissions fall
out of the atmosphere immediately. A further fraction φL remain forever. And the remaining
25The consumption discount rate is the rate at which consumption units are discounted, while the PRTP is
the rate at which utility units are discounted.
26If Weitzman had instead surveyed economists about the best PRTP for climate policy, one would expect
the resulting distribution to put uniformly more weight on lower rates relative to what we get from the study
of consumption discount rates; this hypothetical survey would lead to a higher carbon price than obtained
with the existing study.
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carbon decays at a constant geometric rate. This implies the following formula for decay:
1− ds = φL + (1− φL)φ0(1− φ)s.
They calibrate this model by assuming φL = 0.2, φ0 = 0.393, and φ = 0.0228. We adopt the
same parameter values, but we modify the decay sequence in two ways.
First, we alter the assumption that some fraction of the carbon stock remains in the
atmosphere “forever”. This is a reasonable approximation for the purpose of evaluating the
optimal carbon tax provided the discount rate is moderately high. In that case, nothing
beyond a few hundred years matters in determining the carbon price, so there is no differ-
ence between assuming that a portion of emissions remains for a couple thousand years (as
suggested in the IPCC report) or that it remains literally forever. But this assumption is no
longer harmless if the subjective discount rate is very low (as, for example, in Stern 2007)
or if it declines over time to near zero. In that case, the effect of a portion of emissions
remaining in the atmosphere can be enormous. For example, if the subjective discount rate
declines to zero in finite time, our formula implies that when a portion of emissions remains
forever the near term carbon price is infinite. To avoid this possibility, we instead take the
IPCC description literally and assume that the fraction φ0 remains in the atmosphere for
2000 years.
Our second modification is to assume that 1 − d0 = 0, meaning that current emissions
do not effect damages until after a one period delay. Golosov et al. (2011) assume the
same thing in the their robustness section when they modify their calibration to more closely
replicate the carbon price in Nordhaus (2008). However, in their main calibration, they
assume 1−d0 = 1. Gerlagh and Liski (2012) argue that the implied time lag between emissions
and damages implied by this assumption is inconsistent with most integrated assessment
models27, including DICE (Nordhaus 2008).
6.3 Results
The results are shown in table 1. We report the optimal tax under each discounting scenario
alongside the implied Pigouvian tax in the corresponding no commitment equilibrium. The
results are roughly in line with prior estimates in the literature. For example, Nordhaus and
Boyer (2000) apply the declining discount rate scheme suggested by the UK HM Treasury
(2003) Green Book28. Applied in DICE, this scheme roughly doubles the carbon price com-
pared to their baseline calibration. In our analysis, the optimal tax doubles under the 5%
Stern scenario, and it increases by 65% under Weitzman’s (2001) gamma discounting29.
27Part of the problem is that the Golosov et al. (2011) model does not include temperature inertia, so
stocks induce damages instantaneously, while more complicated IAMs account for the time lag induced by
temperature inertia.
28This is the most significant use of declining social discount rates in actual policy making. The implied
rates are motivated by the uncertainty-based logic in Newell and Pizer (2003). The recommended discount
rates follow a step function that begins at 3.5% for the first 30 years. It then declines in increments until 300
years, after which it remains constant at 1%.
29As noted, our use of Weitzman’s (2001) results are conservative since we treat his estimated consumption
discount factors as pure rates of time preference.
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Optimal tax Pigouvian tax
Nordhaus (2008) 23 23
1% Stern 28 24
5% Stern 46 25
10% Stern 69 27
Stern (2007) 442 442
Weitzman (2001) 38 20
Table 1: The optimal carbon tax is computed using fomula (3.1). The Pigouvian tax is the
present value marginal externality cost at the equilibrium interest rate. Units are dollars
per ton carbon. Results reported for the hyperbolic discounting paths in figure 1 along with
two constant paths. “Nordhaus (2008)” assumes a constant PRTP of 3.0%; “Stern (2007)”
assumes a constant PRTP of 0.1%.
When the PRTP is constant, the optimal tax and the Pigouvian tax are equal. This is
consistent with the finding in Golosov et al. (2011) that the optimal tax equals the marginal
externality cost discounted at the equilibrium interest rate. When the PRTP declines, the
optimal tax is bigger than the Pigouvian tax, reflecting the commitment value of climate
policy in the model. The magnitude of the wedge increases with the rate of decline in the
path of discount rates; thus, the wedge is small for the 1% Stern scenario, while under
“Weitzman (2001)” the optimal tax is almost double the Pigouvian tax.
Another feature of the results is that the Pigouvian taxes are similar in magnitude for
the four DRTP scenarios, even as the optimal taxes differ by a lot. The explanation for
this can be seen by reexamining equation (5.4). As indicated, the equation shows that φt
is bigger than β1 for all t. But the magnitude of this effect is small. As a result, to fairly
close approximation, φt ≈ β1, for all t. The finding is not too surprising since β1 reflects the
subjective discount rate that the decision maker who controls policy in period t would like
to have prevail between t and t + 1. Because of this, the Pigouvian taxes under the Stern-
Nordhaus scenarios are close to the optimal tax using the PRTP from Nordhaus (2008), while
the Pigouvian tax under Weitzman (2001), where β1 is calculated using a declining PRTP
path that starts at 4.0%, is somewhat smaller.
6.3.1 Evaluation of the quasi-hyperbolic approximation
One contribution of the paper is to derive a formula for the near-term carbon price that allows
for an arbitrary path of time preference rates. Gerlagh and Liski (2011), using a similar model,
derive a formula for the carbon price under quasi-hyperbolic discounting. In this section, we
consider how important it might be to move beyond the quasi-hyperbolic approximation when
evaluating a problem like climate change in which time lags span centuries.
Figure 2 shows two plausible quasi-hyperbolic approximations to the continuous “Weitz-
man (2001)” path. Approximation A applies a PRTP of 3.3% over the first decade, then
1.6% thereafter. Approximation B applies a PRTP of 2.4% over the first three decades, fol-
lowed by 0.9% thereafter. Looking at the figure, both approximations appear plausible, and
any attempt to choose among them would presumably be to a large degree arbitrary. Using
formula (3.1) to calculate the carbon price under each approximation, we get a carbon price
of $41 under approximation A and $56 under approximation B. So the carbon price under
approximation A turns out to be quite close to the carbon price of $38 that we computed us-
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Figure 2: Comparison of alternative hyperbolic discounting paths.
ing the original “Weitzman (2001)” path. In contrast, the carbon price using approximation
B is about 50% too high. The implication isn’t that approximation A is necessarily better—
whether it is or not will depend on the calibration—rather, it is that the approximation error
that arises when the analysis is forced into the quasi-hyperbolic specification is quantitatively
important.
7 Conclusion
The paper considers a somewhat simplified version of the dynamic stochastic general equi-
librium climate policy model in Golsov et al. (2011). We derive a formula for the near-term
carbon price when the pure rate of time preference is non-constant. We calibrate the climate
model roughly in line with the calibration in Golosov et al. (2011). Starting with Nordhaus’s
(2008) baseline PRTP under log utility, we find that the effect of a 5% chance that the Stern
(2007) discount rate is correct—or equivalently, the effect of a planner who aggregates prefer-
ences across a population in which 5% of citizens view the Stern rate as correct—is to double
the carbon price relative to what it is when the PRTP is consistent with Nordhaus (2008).
The paper demonstrates two reasons why the considered model provides an extremely
convenient setting in which to consider the implications of non-constant time preference
rates for climate policy. First, time inconsistency concerns, which have bedeviled efforts
to incorporate declining time preference rates into climate policy decision making, fall away
completely. The optimal near term carbon price with commitment is the same as the optimal
near term carbon price in the equilibrium without commitment, and it remains unchanged for
any beliefs that the current generation might hold about the PRTP path (constant, declining
or otherwise) to be applied by subsequent generations.
Second, the motivation for using a declining rate of time preference can be significantly
strengthened in the considered model. An important criticism of most applications of both the
uncertainty-based logic for a declining rate of time preference (Azfar 1999; Weitzman 2001)
and the closely-related preference aggregation argument (Gollier and Zeckhauser 2005) is that
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they implausibly assume that current information is static. Weitzman (2001) anticipated this
concern when he noted: “I think it suffices to think of [the gamma discounting formula] as
defining a table of technocratic time-dependent weights, which give future-dollar equivalence
values for making one-time irreversible decisions. The possibility of being able later to revisit
and revise time-inconsistent investment choices introduces a set of complicated issues that
are better treated separately.” Using the model in this paper, the thorny issues that arise
when Weitzman’s (2001) formulation is embedded in a fully dynamic setting are resolved in
a very simple way: because future changes in the distribution of beliefs (or the distribution
of preferences) do not affect optimal policy today, they can be ignored when computing the
near term carbon price.
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